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I. INTRODUCTION
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times .... -I Depending
upon which side one fell-whether petitioning landowner, Board of
Zoning Appeals board member, or Board of Supervisors/City Council-
these words rang true. The legal application of variances in Virginia law
and other jurisdictions have traveled down a winding road.2 A variance is
a tool that a delegated body may use to permit a deviation from the
local ordinance. 3  In Virginia, variances may only be granted for
dimensional or area deviations. 4 Commonly referred to as an "escape
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1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 1 (Andrew Sander ed., Oxford University Press 1988)
(1853).
2. Cf Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 764, 594 S.E.2d 571, 576
(2004) (stating that variances may only be granted in narrow circumstances to avoid an
unconstitutional result); J. Elliott Drinard, Municipal Corporations, 46 VA. L. REv. 1638, 1640-42
(1960) (discussing changes in the law respecting variances in zoning regulations); David W. Owens,
The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 295-99 (2004) (discussing how variances have been used widely in practice
despite the law). For a quick summary of the Cochran case, see Brian R. Marron, Real Estate and
Land Use Law, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 357, 398-400 (2004).
3. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (1926). This standard act provides limitations for
variances "as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the
spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done." Id.; see also Brent Ellis
Dickson, The Effect of Statutory Prerequisites on Decisions of Boards of Zoning Appeals, 1 IND. LEGAL
F. 398, 398 (1967) (stating that a variance should be distinguished from a special exception, which
permits "property to be used for purposes which, although contrary to the specific zoning
classification for the area in which the property is located, are expressly authorized by the ordinance
as contingent upon board approval.").
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2201 (Repl. Vol. 2008). A zoning ordinance variance is defined as:
a reasonable deviation from those provisions regulating the size or area of a lot
or parcel of land, or the size, area, bulk or location of a building or structure
when the strict application of the ordinance would result in unnecessary or
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hatch" or "escape valve," 5 a variance provides localities with the ability
to prevent unconstitutional takings that violate either the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of Virginia. 6 As stated in an
early Virginia variance case:
there will arise from time to time exceptional situations
which will justly call for the granting of individual
variances within the prescribed legislative conditions and
standards and in harmony with the intended spirit and
purpose of zoning ordinances, thereby providing a
safeguard from unreasonable restrictions on the use of
property.'
For quite some time, those who applied for variances enjoyed a
likelihood of realizing their efforts. 8 Since 2004, however, Virginia has
experienced heightened judicial scrutiny over the administration of
variances. 9 The 2009 General Assembly of Virginia reviewed relevant
sections of the Code of Virginia and amended the law concerning
variances. 10  The effect of the General Assembly's seemingly slight
revision presents the purpose of this comment.
Part II of this comment presents the General Assembly's enactment.
Part III discusses the development of the relevant area of variance law
that has fostered dissent. This part also presents Cochran v. Fairfax
unreasonable hardship to the property owner, and such need for a variance
would not be shared generally by other properties, and provided such variance
is not contrary to the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance, and would
result in substantial justice being done. It shall not include a change in use which
change shall be accomplished by a rezoning or by a conditional zoning.
Id. Virginia does not permit a use variance, which allows a jurisdiction to permit a property use
prohibited by a zoning ordinance. See Dickson, supra note 3. One commentator notes that
jurisdictions try to harmonize variance practice and statutory commands by applying less stringent tests
to increase the availability of variances. Owens, supra note 2, at 289-90 (noting that jurisdictions apply
less stringent standards for area variances than use variances because area variances are less
harmful).
5. See Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122,267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; VA. CONST. art. I § 11.
7. Azalea Corp. v. City of Richmond, 201 Va. 636, 640, 112 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1960).
8. See Owens, supra note 2, at 295-96 ("Studies confirmed that variance approval rates in the 7 0 /o-
80% range continued to be common throughout the 1960-1990 period in a wide variety of settings,
including urban, small town, and rural jurisdictions.").
9. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 268 Va. 441, 604 S.E.2d 7 (2004); Cochran v.
Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 766, 594 S.E.2d 571, 577 (2004) (holding that a
Board of Zoning Appeals has no authority to grant a variance unless the effect of the ordinance would
represent an unconstitutional taking); see also Goyonaga v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 275 Va. 232, 657
S.E.2d 153 (2008); Amherst County Bd. of Supervisors v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 70 Va. Cir. 91
(2005); Aesy v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 66 Va. Cir. 382 (2005).
10. H.B. 2326, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), 1, § 15.2-2309 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,
2009, ch. 206, 2009 Va. Acts _).
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County Board of Zoning Appeals1 1 as a landmark case in Virginia
variance law and examines subsequent developments, which are all likely
targets for revision. Part IV brings the previous parts to bear addressing
and discussing the impact of House Bill 2326 on variance law.1 2 Part of
this discussion revisits case law for facts that exemplify and temper the
Code revision. As this comment will demonstrate, the General Assembly
has a legislative desire to decrease the scrutiny of the variance test.
II. HoUSEBILL2326
The General Assembly amended section 15.2-2309 of the Virginia
Code, which delegates authority to Boards of Zoning Appeals ("BZA")
to grant variances.1 3  Section 15.2-2309 provides the procedure,
standards, and notice requirements for variances.1 4  The General
Assembly's revision deleted two words from the code provision:
When a property owner can show that his property was acquired in
good faith and where by reason of the exceptional narrowness,
shallowness, size or shape of a specific piece of property at the time of
the effective date of the ordinance, or where by reason of exceptional
topographic conditions or other extraordinary situation or condition of
the piece of property, or of the condition, situation, or development of
property immediately adjacent thereto, the strict application of the
terms of the ordinance would effectively prohibit or unreasonably
restrict the utilization of the property or where the board is satisfied,
upon the evidence heard by it, that the granting of the variance will
alleviate a clearly demonstrable hardship approaehing onfiseatiefn, as
distinguished from a special privilege or convenience sought by the
applicant, provided that all variances shall be in harmony with the
intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance.15
Therefore, what does removing "approaching confiscation"
accomplish? To understand this question, one should be informed of
contemporary Virginia variance practice and the importance of
"approaching confiscation."
11. 267 Va. 756, 594 S.E.2d 571 (2004).
12. H.B. 2326, 1, § 15.2-2309 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2009, ch. 206).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309 (Repl. Vol. 2008); H.B. 2326, 1, § 15.2-2309 (enacted as Act of
Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 206); see also E.A. Prichard, The Fundamental ofZoning Law, 46 VA. L. REv. 362,
364-66 (1960) (discussing the form and function of Virginia Boards of Zoning Appeals).
14. VA. CODE. ANN. § 15.2-2309 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
15. H.B. 2326, 1, § 15.2-2309 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2009, ch. 206).
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III. THE "UNNECESSARY HARDSHIP" HURDLE-VIRGINIA VARIANCE
PRACTICE SINCE 2004
The originally conceived notion of permitting a variance from an
ordinance contained language requiring a demonstration of "unnecessary
hardship" before permitting deviation from legislatively enabled
ordinances. 16 The "unnecessary hardship" provision, possibly the most
challenging aspect of a variance application,1 7 permeates state codes and
common law.18 "Unnecessary hardship" is an elusive term requiring
BZAs and courts to determine the definition.1 9  In Virginia, courts
interpret the language of section 15.2-2309 when a BZA's application is
appealed. 20  In 2004, the Supreme Court of Virginia settled any
controversy concerning "unnecessary hardship" interpretation and
explicated the proper standard and analysis. 21
A. Cochran v. Fairfax County Board of Zoning Appeals
1. The Facts and Procedure of Cochran
In Cochran, the Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated three cases
from Fairfax County, the Town of Pulaski, and the City of Virginia
Beach involving variance applications. 22  Each case involved a
landowner petitioning its respective BZA for an area variance pursuant
to section 15.2-2309.23 Discussion of the three cases will aid in
understanding the court's analysis.
The Fairfax County case involved a landowner's petition for a
variance from front yard setbacks to posture their proposed house and
utilize a side garage.2 4 The Fairfax County BZA granted the front yard
setback variance and three other requested variances over neighborhood
dissent. 25 The circuit court affirmed the BZA's decision. 26
16. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7(3) (1926); Owens, supra note 2, at 282-84
(discussing zoning laws that predated the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act).
17. Owens, supra note 2, at 288.
18. Id. at 286-87.
19. Id. at 287 (noting that the term "unnecessary hardship" was left "to the judiciary and the good
judgment of board of adjustment to fill in the details ofjust what situations qualify for a variance").
20. See Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 121-22,267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980).
21. See Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 594 S.E.2d 571 (2004)
(holding that a BZA has authority to grant variances only to avoid an unconstitutional result).
22. Id. at 759-64, 594 S.E.2d at 573-76.
23. Id. at 759, 594 S.E.2d at 573.
24. Id. at 759-60, 594 S.E.2d at 573-74.
25. Id. at 761, 594 S.E.2d at 574.
26. Id.
2009]
HOUSE BILL 2326 AND COCHRAN
The variance case from the Town of Pulaski also involved a
landowner desiring to construct a garage. 27 The landowner planned to
place the garage adjacent to a roadway within a setback. 28  The
topography of their lot made building the garage in accordance with the
ordinance nearly impossible.29 The Pulaski BZA granted a modified
variance permitting construction of a garage within the setbacks. 30 The
circuit court affirmed the BZA's decision.
31
The City of Virginia Beach variance case arose from an application to
construct a shed. 32  Virginia Beach ordinances concerning accessory
structures prohibited the landowners from constructing a shed at the
landowner's desired height. 33 The landowner also petitioned to bring a
previously constructed garage into conformity by seeking a variance for
the twenty-eight feet by which the existing garage exceeded the
limitations imposed by the zoning ordinance. 34 The Virginia Beach BZA
granted the garage variance but denied the shed variance on the grounds
that "no hardship" existed.35 The landowner appealed, and the circuit
court overruled the BZA's decision, thereby granting the shed
variance. 36
2. The Virginia Supreme Court's Analysis and Decision in Cochran
Before analyzing the merits of the three variance cases, the Virginia
Supreme Court discussed precedent and the basis for the government's
authority to decide such controversies. 37 The government's authority
to grant variances comes from the section of the Constitution of
Virginia that prohibits the government from depriving citizens from the
use of their property without just compensation. 38  The court then
restated the following proposition:
Because a facially valid zoning ordinance may prove unconstitutional
in application to a particular landowner, some device is needed to
27. Id. at 761-62, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 762, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 763, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
33. Id. at 762-63, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 763, 594 S.E.2d at 576.
36. Id. at 763-64, 594 S.E.2d at 576.
37. Id. at 764, 594 S.E.2d at 576.
38. Id. (citing VA CONST. art. I § Il(III)(C)).
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protect landowners' rights without destroying the viability of zoning
ordinances. The variance traditionally has been designed to serve this
function. In this role, the variance aptly has been called an "escape
hatch" or "escape valve." A statute may, of course, authorize variance
in where an ordinance's application to a particular property is not
unconstitutional. However, the language used in Code § 15.1-495(b)
[now § 15.2-2309(2)] to define "unnecessary hardship" clearly indicates
that the General Assembly intended that variances be granted only in
cases where application of zoning restrictions would appear to be
constitutionally impermissible.39
Applying the precedent of Packer v. Hornsby,4 the court concluded
that the BZA could only grant variances to circumvent "an
unconstitutional result. ' 41  Finally, the court discussed the General
Assembly's delegation of power to administrative bodies and quoted
pertinent sections of the Virginia Code.42
The Virginia Supreme Court applied the cited Code and precedent to
analyze the three individual cases in Cochran.43 In each of the cases,
the court evaluated the record to determine whether the applicants
demonstrated "unnecessary hardship," and in each case, the court found
the landowners failed to show "unnecessary hardship." 44
In each of the three cases, the court remodeled and reconfigured the
variance petitions. In the Fairfax County case, the court determined
that the ordinance did not create an "unnecessary hardship" because the
house could be moved two feet to satisfy the ordinance and creating
"curb appeal" was not a proper justification for a variance. 45 In the
Pulaski case, the court suggested that the garage could be moved or
abandoned without denying the landowner reasonable use of his
property. 46 Finally, in the Virginia Beach case, the court determined
that the shed could be built as an adjoining home addition or abandoned
39. Id. (quoting Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122,267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980)).
40. 221 Va. 117,267 S.E.2d 140 (1980).
41. Cochran, 267 Va. at 764, 594 S.E.2d at 576.
42. Id. at 765-66, 594 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County
Utilities Corp., 223 Va. 534, 542, 290 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1982)). The court also addressed an argument
raised in Natrella v. Board ofZoning Apppeals, 231 Va. 451, 345 S.E.2d 295 (1986), which involved an
apartment conversion project where the court permitted a variance because the statute authorized a
variance for an instance "where an ordinance's application to particular property is not
unconstitutional." Cochran, 267 Va. at 766 n.3, 594 S.E.2d at 577 n.3 (citing Packer, 221 Va. at 122,
267 S.E.2d at 142).
43. Cochran, 267 Va. at 766-67, 594 S.E.2d at 577-78.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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without interfering with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property. 47
The court recognized that the landowners still maintained "reasonable
beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole. '48 The final decision
vacated variances granted in Fairfax County and the Town of Pulaski
and reinstated the BZA's denial of a variance in Virginia Beach.. 49 The
landowners did not receive variances to construct and encroach upon
setsbacks. 0
B. Variance Administration and Review since Cochran
1. Supreme Court of Virginia Cases Applying Cochran
The Supreme Court of Virginia revisited the precedent of Cochran in
two cases. 1 Only five months after Cochran, the court decided one case
involving similar issues.5 2 In Board of Supervisors v. Board of Zoning
Appeals,5 3 a landowner sought a variance to encroach the minimum lot
width to subdivide and construct two homes on his property.5 4 The BZA
granted the landowner a variance conditioned on the landowner
satisfying other requirements of the Code.5 5 The circuit court affirmed
the BZA's decision.5 6  The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the
circuit court and vacated the BZA's variance grant.57
The Supreme Court of Virginia based its decision in Board of
Supervisors v. Board of Zoning Appeals upon Cochran.5 8 Unlike in
Cochran, the court in Board of Supervisors first restated the important
facts for variance review.59 The court cited Cochran and Packer to
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 767, 594 S.E.2d at 578.
50. Id.
51. See Cherrystone Inlet, LLC v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 271 Va. 670, 628 S.E.2d 324 (2006); Bd. of
Supervisorsv. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 268 Va. 441, 604 S.E.2d 7 (2004).
52. Compare Bd. of Supervisors v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 268 Va. 441, 604 S.E.2d 7 (2004), with
Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals,267 Va. 756, 594 S.E.2d 571 (2004).
53. 268 Va. 441, 604 S.E.2d 7 (2004).
54. Id. at 444, 604 S.E.2d at 8. This case focuses more upon an issue of standing than variance
administration. See id. at 445-51, 604 S.E.2d at 8-12.
55. Id. at 444, 604 S.E.2d at 8.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 453, 604 S.E.2d at 13.
58. Id.
59. Compare id. at 451-52, 604 S.E.2d at 12, with Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
267 Va. 756, 764, 594 S.E.2d 571, 576 (2004). The court resolved two issues in Board of Supervisors,
whereas in Cochran the court reviewed only the variance issue. Compare Board of Supervisors, 268
Va. at 450-51, 604 S.E.2d at 12, with Cochran, 267 Va. at 764-66, 594 S.E.2d at 576-77.
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support its finding that the ordinance did not deprive the landowner of
"all reasonable beneficial uses" or create an "undue hardship. ' ' 6°
According to the court, "undue hardship" could not be satisfied when an
ordinance prohibited the subdividing of property and construction of
newer homes. 61 Because the landowner owned and enjoyed the use of his
home, the court decided the landowner did not incur an "undue hardship"
warranting a section 15.2-2309 variance. 6
2
The second case decided by the Virginia Supreme Court presented a
more complex issue of variance administration because of overlapping
setbacks. 63 In Cherrystone Inlet, the landowner sought a variance to
construct four homes on four recently subdivided lots. 64 The overlap of
ordinances establishing setbacks came from local road setbacks and
locally adopted state Chesapeake Bay Preservation laws. 65 The BZA
unanimously denied the landowners variance application. 66 The circuit
court affirmed the BZA's decision. 67 The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the circuit court's decision. 68
The Virginia Supreme Court first reasoned that variances were
improper because the lots were not recorded before the Chesapeake Bay
laws became effective. 69 Second, the court relied on Cochran and held
that the landowner failed to demonstrate that the ordinances deprived
him of "all reasonable beneficial uses."7 0  Before affirming the BZA's
variance denial, the court noted that the landowner could have built one
house on six and a half acres of land resting on an inlet. 71
60. Bd. of Supervisors, 268 Va. at 452, 604 S.E.2d at 12-13 (quoting Cochran, 267 Va. at 766, 594
S.E.2d at 577-78). The court also cited the facts of Board of Zoning Appeals v. Nowak, 227 Va. 201,
315 S.E.2d 221 (1984), to show an ordinance that prevents the construction of a home in setback areas
does not constitute a hardship. Bd. of Supervisors, 268 Va. at 453, 604 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting Nowak,
227 Va. at 205, 315 S.E.2d at 223).
61. Bd. of Supervisors, 268 Va. at 453, 604 S.E.2d at 13.
62. See id. at 453, 604 S.E.2d at 12-13.
63. See Cherrystone Inlet, LLC v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 271 Va. 670, 672, 628 S.E.2d 324, 324
(2006).
64. Id. at 672-73, 628 S.E.2d at 325.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 673-74, 628 S.E.2d at 325.
67. Id. at 674, 628 S.E.2d at 325-26.
68. Id. at 675, 628 S.E.2d at 326.
69. Id. The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act only allows variances for intrusions under "very
restricted circumstances." See id. at 673 n.2, 628 S.E.2d at 325 n.2.
70. Id. at 675, 628 S.E.2d at 326.
71. Id.
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2. Circuit Court Cases Applying Cochran
Since 2004, two Virginia circuit courts have reviewed BZA decisions
and have applied the Cochran rule.7 2 In Aesy v. Board of Zoning
Appeals,7 3 a landowner purchased property with an accessory structure-
a barn-that pre-dated the local zoning ordinances.7 4 The barn became
an issue after the landowner built and attempted to occupy a home. 75
To remedy the zoning violation and occupy his home, the landowner
sought a variance for the seventy-five year old barn.76 The BZA denied
the variance application. 77  When the circuit court reviewed the
variance denial, the court relied on Cochran and stated, "if any
reasonable beneficial use of the property can be made in accordance with
the existing zoning ordinance, then the BZA has no authority to grant a
variance, and an unnecessary hardship as contemplated by statute
[section 15.2-2309] does not exist. ' 78  The court reasoned that no
undue hardship existed because the landowner could remove the barn and
enjoy a reasonable use of his property. 79 The circuit court affirmed the
BZA's denial. 80
In the second circuit court case applying the standard of Cochran, the
court reviewed a request for a sign to encroach upon a height
limitation. 81 In Amherst County Board of Supervisors, the landowner
operated a John Deere tractor retail operation. 82 Franchise rules and
state regulations required the retail store to erect a sign.83 Local law
limited the sign to ten feet in height, while the landowner desired the
sign to be twenty feet in height. 84 The landowner sought a variance to
construct a twenty-foot sign, because a ten-foot sign would be nearly
obstructed on one side and fully obstructed on the other side.85 The
72. Amherst County Bd. of Supervisors v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 70 Va. Cir. 91 (2005); Aesy v. Bd.
of Zoning Appeals, 66 Va. Cir. 382 (2005).
73. 66 Va. Cir. 382 (2005).
74. Id. at 382.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 383-84.
79. Id. at 384. The landowner pleaded to the court that he could not afford demolition. Id. at 382.
80. Id. at 382.
81. Amherst County Bd. of Supervisors v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 70 Va. Cir. 91, 91 (2005).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 91-92.
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BZA granted the variance. 86  In a letter opinion, the circuit court
reversed and vacated the variance grant. 87 The court cited the standard
given in Cochran and held that unnecessary and undue hardship only
exists when an ordinance "interfere[s] with all reasonable beneficial uses
of the property, taken as a whole." 88  The court explained that
variances are only permitted when "zoning restrictions are so
constitutionally impermissible that there is a hardship approaching
confiscation." 89
IV. HOUSE BILL 23 26's EFFECT ON COCHRAN
In response to this strict interpretation of "unnecessary hardship,"
the General Assembly amended the language of the statute governing
BZAs evaluation of variance petitions. 90 The Supreme Court of Virginia
relied upon the previous code section to evaluate variance decisions in
Cochran.91  The impact of deleting two words from the Code has
profound implications for the administration and review of variances.
Alternatively, the various bodies that make zoning appeals decisions
may nullify the impact of removing these two words. The following
discussion argues that deleting the words "approaching confiscation"
impacts variance administration and review by decreasing the degree of
hardship applicants must show.
A. Does House Bill 2326 Revert Variance Practice to Pre-Cochran?
For most of the twentieth century, petitioning landowners received
variances without much difficulty, aside from presenting their case. 92 In
Virginia, the Virginia Supreme Court ended variance abuse with the
Cochran case. 93 The court's heightened standard in Cochran, however,
86. Id. at 91.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 92 (citing Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 766, 594 S.E.2d
571, 577 (2004)).
89. Id. at93 (citing Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122,267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980)).
90. See H.B. 2326, 1, § 15.2-2309 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2009, ch. 206).
91. See Cochran, 267 Va. 756, 594 S.E.2d 571; see also Cherrystone Inlet, LLC v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 271 Va. 670, 628 S.E.2d 324 (2006); Bd. of Supervisors v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 268 Va.
441, 604 S.E.2d 7 (2004).
92. See, e.g., Roderick M. Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible, or Fluid?, 44 J. URB. L. 287, 292-94
(1966); Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The Zoning Board ofAdjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273, 320-21 (1961); Owens, supra note 2, at 295-96. The approval rate raised
concern that the merits of each individual case may not satisfy the purpose of variances. Id. at 297-
98.
93. Cf Cochran, 267 Va. at 767, 594 S.E.2d at 578.
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may have gone too far. 94 The General Assembly's amendment removed
an important phrase: 95 two words that make variance hardship less
stringent.
Removing the phrase "approaching confiscation" alters the Cochran
analysis directly because it undermines Cochran's rule of law. The
Cochran court demanded that the threshold question of BZA variance
petitions be whether the zoning ordinance "interferes with all reasonable
beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole. ' 96 The court arrived
at that proposition because the language of the statute commanded
demonstration of an "unnecessary hardship" by showing how a variance
would "alleviate a clearly demonstrable hardship approaching
confiscation." 97 Virginia courts and BZAs should now recognize the
legislative intent in removing these two crucial words. If takings
jurisprudence is no longer the fall line,98 then the statutory command of
"unnecessary hardship" must be something short of the "no reasonable
use" test. 99
B. The New Meaning of "Unnecessary Hardship"
In the near future, the Supreme Court of Virginia and Virginia circuit
courts will be forced to interpret the new meaning of "unnecessary
hardship." Before that review, BZAs will apply the revised law. When
courts review variance cases concerning whether the landowner
demonstrated "unnecessary hardship," the Cochran standard should be
considered too restrictive. Because of the recent legislative changes,
courts should move toward a definition of "unnecessary hardship" that is
less stringent than Cochran's rule.
94. Cf Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (borrowing Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous
phrase "[w]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking").
95. H.B. 2326, 1, § 15.2-2309 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,2009, ch. 206).
96. Cochran, 267 Va. at 767, 594 S.E.2d at 578.
97. Id. at 765-66, 594 S.E.2d at 577 (emphasis added).
98. The line of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States includes: Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
99. The Cochran court cited to Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), to support the takings test of interference
"with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole." Cochran, 276 Va. at 764-65,
594 S.E.2d at 576 (citing Commonwealth v. County Utils., 223 Va. 534, 542, 290 S.E.2d 867, 872
(1982)) (emphasis removed).
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Before Cochran, the Virginia Supreme Court recognized the use of a
variance as a flexible tool to avoid constitutional issues."° In Azalea
Corp. v. City of Richmond,"1 a landowner sought a variance to construct
roadways across residentially zoned property for its commercial
operation. 1°2 The City of Richmond denied the landowner a variance
because the city thought the requested roads would violate the zoning
ordinance. 10 3 The BZA and circuit court affirmed the variance denial. 10 4
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and issued a variance for the road
construction. 10 5  The court recognized that without commercially
supportable road access, the landowner's property would lose substantial
real estate value and the grant of road access to the landowner would not
damage the value of residences in the surrounding area. 106 For these
reasons, the Virginia Supreme Court found the grant of a variance
"would do substantial justice." 107
The court's language in Azalea is unlike that of Cochran. But the
issues faced, between a substantial loss in value in Azalea and a major
inconvenience in Cochran, are similar. Azalea demonstrates the court's
desire to recognize certain factors as important in a variance request and
appreciate those factors as an "unnecessary hardship."
Packer followed Azalea by twenty years, but forms a bridge between
the reasoning and language of Azalea and Cochran.10 8 Packer involved a
landowner wishing to build an addition within a setback area. 109 The
BZA granted the landowner's variance. 10 The circuit court reversed the
BZA and denied the variance.1 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed,
finding that the BZA abused its discretion and the landowner failed to
demonstrate the required hardship. 112 Packer's significance comes more
from its recognition that "[a] statute may... authorize variances in cases
where an ordinance's application to particular property is not
100. Drinard, supra note 2. A granted variance would not stand if the record was devoid of evidence
or the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1640.
101. 201 Va. 636, 112 S.E.2d 862 (1960).
102. Id. at 637, 112 S.E.2d at 863. The property in question was both in Henrico County and the City
of Richmond. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 638, 112 S.E.2d at 864.
105. Id. at 643-44, 112 S.E.2d at 867-68.
106. Id. Without road access, the value of the property would decline from $729,000 to $202,000, or
a 72% decrease. Id. at 643, 112 S.E.2d at 867.
107. Id. at 644, 112 S.E.2d at 867.
108. See Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117,267 S.E.2d 140 (1980).
109. Id. at 119-20, 267 S.E.2d at 141.
110. Id. at 120,267 S.E.2d at 141.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 120, 123,267 S.E.2d at 141, 143.
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unconstitutional."11 3 This finding recognizes that the language of the
statute, specifically "approaching confiscation," was commensurate with
takings jurisprudence. While the landowner's variance petition in
Packer would likely still fail today for other reasons, a court could not
discount all hardship because some hardship existed.114 In other words,
section 15.2-2309(2)'s "unnecessary hardship" is not the same degree as
before.
The Virginia Supreme Court's language used in the Azalea and Packer
decisions suggests that some law exists to consider section 15.2-
2309(2)'s "unnecessary hardship" as less than Cochran's "no reasonable
use" standard. In fact, some jurisdictions do not use the language
''unnecessary hardship," using instead the language "practical
difficulties" to evaluate granting a variance. 5 "Practical difficulties" is
clearly not the standard in Virginia, but this standard helps realize the
boundaries of "unnecessary hardship." Jurisdictions using the "practical
difficulties" standard apply the test by asking whether an "affected
property or structure cannot, as a practical matter, be used for a
permitted purpose under the applicable zoning classification."11 6 An
affirmative answer to the "practical difficulties" inquiry warrants a
variance. 117
The General Assembly's revision of section 15.2-2309(2) reflects a
move to decrease scrutiny and evaluate hardship less stringently.118 A
less stringent approach to variance administration promotes fairness and
flexibility.119 Variances prove more cost-effective than either amending
ordinances upon request or through rezoning. 121
Even Cochran assists in determining what the court views or should
view as demonstrated hardships satisfying section 15.2-2309(2).121 In
113. Id. at 122,267 S.E.2d at 142.
114. Id. "[T]he Packers do not face a 'hardship appfrachifg conficatiq n,' nor has their use of their
land been effectively prohibited or unreasonably restricted." Id. at 122, 267 S.E.2d at 142-43
(language stricken to reflect the H.B. 2326 revision). This statement loses its value with the removal
of "approaching confiscation." Packer is not the best example case because the landowners spoke
about, and the court grasped onto, a desire to expand their home for better views and because
everyone else was encroaching setbacks. Id. at 119-22,267 S.E.2d at 141-43.
115. See Bryden, supra note 92, at 323.
116. 12 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79C.14[l][b] (2008); see also Bryden,
supra note 92, at 324.
117. See POWELL, supra note 116; see also Bryden, supra note 92, at 324.
118. See Owens, supra note 2, at 290 (citing Simplex Tech., Inc. v. Town of Newington, 766 A.2d
713, 717 (N.H. 2001)).
119. See Dickson, supra note 3, at 411.
120. See Owens, supra note 2, at 317.
121. Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 767, 594 S.E.2d 571, 578 (2004).
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Cochran, the court mentioned the following facts of the three cases as
providing compelling reasons: taxes, aesthetic improvements, landowner
planning to mitigate effects, neighbor support and/or opposition,
landowner expense, and personal need.1 22 The court did not classify
these factors as hardships but commented on them as deserving of
attention. 123 Although Cochran's main proposition no longer guides
variance decisions, these factors help to decipher the requirements
necessary to satisfy "unnecessary hardship."
C. What Cases Should Pass the New "Unnecessary Hardship" Test?
When considering the impact of the new hardship standard, it will
help to review a set of facts and determine whether the landowner
demonstrated "a clearly demonstrable hardship" satisfying "unnecessary
hardship." The Virginia Beach and Pulaski cases from Cochran may
have turned out differently if the revised section 15.2-2309 applied.1 24
The Pulaski case involved a garage siting with various factors posing a
hardship, but not enough for an undue hardship approaching
confiscation. 125 Based upon the court's opinion, the landowner may
have satisfied the new hardship standard because it would be more
expensive to build the garage to code, the topography of the property
justifies its location, and alternative placement would most likely
weaken or destroy a retaining wall. 126  An ordinance prohibiting a
landowner from building a garage may satisfy an "unnecessary hardship"
requirement short of the no reasonable use determination. Requiring an
individual to construct a garage that costs more, creates other issues, and
presents a design conflict would most likely constitute a hardship that a
variance could alleviate.
The Virginia Beach case involved the desire to build a storage shed.1 27
The landowner's desired shed was only a few hundred square feet in
excess of the limitation.1 28  The purpose of the shed was to hold
belongings so that a family member could assist a seriously ill and
122. Id. Other factors considered include: "reasonable return, inability to sell, financial loss, the
effect of adjacent uses, the effect of heavy traffic, or the shape, size, or grade of the property."
POWELL, supra note 116.
123. Cochran, 267 Va. at 767, 594 S.E.2d at 578.
124. Id. at 761-64, 594 S.E.2d at 574-76. The Fairfax case, doomed by the statement "curb appeal,"
should still fail "unnecessary hardship." Id. at 759-61, 594 S.E.2d at 573-74.
125. Id. at 761-62, 594 S.E.2d at 574-75.
126. Id. at 762, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
127. Id. at 762-64, 594 S.E.2d at 575-76.
128. Id.
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disabled family member. 129 The personal needs of this family alone
might not constitute an "unnecessary hardship," but considering the lack
of community opposition, these facts could be classified as a hardship
that a variance could alleviate.130
D. Jurisdictions, Administrators, and Neighbors Should Welcome the
New "Unnecessary Hardship" Standard
The General Assembly revised only two words in Virginia Code
section 15.2-2309;131 the majority of the statute remains intact with
established judicial interpretations and precedent.1 32 Petitioners still are
required to satisfy other factors.133  The statute commands BZAs to
make three findings.1 34 The standards require the BZA to record its
findings based upon the applicant's presentation, and the BZA's report
creates a record for courts to consider and ensures that variance power is
not abused.135  This change will not cause variance petitions to run
rampant, but now petitioning landowners will no longer have to meet
the standard of takings-the "no reasonable use" test-to justify their
area variance.
E. What Cases Should Fail?
To address the community concerns of possible arbitrary and
capricious variance administration, revisiting some case law should calm
interested parties. The Fairfax County case in Cochran would still be
denied by the BZA and the judiciary. 136 The landowner's frivolous desire
to construct a home may not constitute a satisfactory hardship, but it
does conflict with the language of section 15.2-2309, which prohibits
129. Id. at 763-64, 594 S.E.2s at 576.
130. See id.
131. See H.B. 2326, 1, § 15.2-2309 (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 206).
132. See id. ; see also Steele v. Fluvanna County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 246 Va. 502, 507, 436 S.E.2d
453, 457 (1993) (holding that a landowner cannot create their own hardship).
133. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309(2).
134. Id. § 15.2-2309(2)(a)-(c) ("That the strict application of the ordinance would produce undue
hardship relating to the property; that the hardship is not shared generally by other properties in the
same zoning district and the same vicinity; and that the authorization of the variance will not be of
substantial detriment to adjacent property and that the character of the district will not be changed by
the granting of the variance.").
135. See Drinard, supra note 2, at 1641.
136. See Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 759-61, 594 S.E.2d 571,
573-74 (2004).
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variances for special privilege. 137 In Packer, the issue of consistency
extinguishes the landowner's chance of variance. 138  The landowner
attempted to show a hardship by virtue of other properties not
satisfying setbacks along the waterfront, which the BZA accepted. 139
Even where facts point to other violations, no BZA should grant, nor
should a court affirm, a variance because the hardship is generally
shared. 140 House Bill 2326's revisions do not grant BZAs unfettered
discretion. The rule of law developed by the Virginia Supreme Court will
still guide BZAs and judicial variance review.
V. CONCLUSION
The new legislative changes to section 15.2-2309(2) suggest that
BZAs should no longer inquire whether a zoning ordinance "interferes
with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole."
Instead, BZAs should apply a less restrictive threshold question, adopting
a standard which reflects the General Assembly's decision to remove
"approaching confiscation" from section 15.2-2309(2) and scrutinize
variance petitions less. Virginia courts should also recognize the
departure from a high hurdle of hardship and find more factors and
circumstances deserving of an area variance. The hardship required to
satisfy variance petitions no longer requires the deprivation of all
reasonable use. A demonstration short of the Cochran test should now
satisfy law.
137. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309(2); Cochran, 267 Va. at 760, 594 S.E.2d at 574.
138. See Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 119-20,267 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1980).
139. Id. at 122, 267 S.E.2d at 143.
140. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309(2)(b).
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